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a b s t r a c t
We report on a method for formally specifying and verifying programmable logic
controllers (PLCs) in the specification language TLA+. The specification framework is
generic. It separates the description of the environment from that of the controller itself
and its structure is consistent with the scan cycle mechanism used by PLCs. Specifications
can be parameterized with the number of replicated components. In our experience, the
structuring mechanisms of TLA+ help to obtain clear, well-organized, and configurable
specifications, finite instances of which are verified by the TLA+ model checker TLC.
We have validated our approach on a concrete case study, a controller for fire fighting
equipment in a ship dock, and report on the results obtained for this case study.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) arewidely used in industry [1,2] for embedded systems. A PLC interactswith user
commands andwith the controlled plant, following a so-called scan cyclemechanism that startswith inputting environment
data (including user commands), then performs a local computation, and finally outputs the results to the environment.With
their increasing use, PLC systems become more and more complex. Formal methods promise to ensure the correctness of
complex systems. Through formal specifications of the designed behaviors of the system, they can help a designer to clarify
the design ideas, eliminate ambiguities and find errors with the help of tools.
TLA+ is a formal specification language, which was designed for specifying and reasoning about concurrent and reactive
systems [3]. It can formulate both system behaviors and their properties in a single logic formalism. Moreover, it provides
supports for parameterization, advanced data structures, etc. Last but not the least, it has powerful tool support, in particular
the TLA+ model checker TLC [4]. Theorem-proving support in the form of a proof assistant is also being developed, but we
have not used it for our specifications of PLCs.
In this paper, we propose a method for specifying PLC systems using TLA+. In particular, we specify the reaction cycle
according to the scan cyclemechanism of PLCs. Exploiting the parameterization and abstraction facilities of TLA+, we obtain
a generic specification pattern per module that distinguishes between actions of the user, the controller, and the plant. This
pattern is instantiated for a concrete PLC, and different modules are composed to obtain the overall system specification.
We exhibit the method on a running example, a controller for fire fighting in a ship dock, and report our experiences on
verifying the specifications with the model checker TLC.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the specification language TLA+ in Section 2. The dock fire-fighting
example is described in Section 3. In Section 4,we illustrate ourmethod of specifying a PLC systemwith TLA+. The properties
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Fig. 1. A digital clock TLA+ specification.
description and the experimental results with the tool TLC are presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we explain the features
of our work by comparing it with other model checking languages. Finally, we conclude the paper and present future work.
2. The TLA+ specification language
The specification language TLA+ [3,5] is based on the Temporal Logic of Actions TLA [6], a dialect of linear-time temporal
logic, and on Zermelo–Fränkel set theory for representing data structures. Built on ordinary mathematics together with a
light-weight temporal logic, TLA+ can be used to write precise, formal specifications of discrete systems.
To get an intuitive understanding of TLA+ specifications, a digital clock example is shown in Fig. 1, with the comment
lines shadowed.
TLA+ specifications are composed by modules. With the EXTENDS statement, a module can extend standard TLA+
modules or the modules already defined in another specification. The variables should be declared before use by the
VARIABLES statement. A type invariant definition is not mandatory but often adopted to present the type constraint that
the specification should satisfy. A TLA+ specification of a transition system is defined by a formula, with the form
Init ∧ [Next]v ∧ L
where v is a tuple containing all state variables of the system. The first conjunct Init describes the possible initial states of the
system. The second conjunct of the specification asserts that every step (i.e., every pair of successive states in a system run)
either satisfies Next or leaves the term v (and therefore all state variables) unchanged. Allowing for such stuttering steps is
a key ingredient to obtain compositionality of specifications, however, it means that executions that stutter indefinitely are
allowed by the specification. The third conjunct L is a temporal formula stating the liveness conditions of the specification,
and in particular can be used to rule out infinite stuttering.
As to the digital clock specification in Fig. 1, we take zero hour and zerominute as the initial state of the system. The next-
state action can be either ClockAction1 or ClockAction2. The former defines how the minute and the hour change when the
hour is less than 23, while the latter defines the case when the hour equals 23. The liveness constraint is given by the form
WFv(A), to represent theweak-fairness constraint of action 〈A〉v . It requires that the action 〈A〉v (defined as A∧ v′ 6= v) holds
infinitely often provided it is persistently enabled. Since the action 〈Next〉vars is always enabled, it ensures the movement of
the clock, instead of it stopping forever.
TLC is a model checker designed and implemented for TLA+ specifications. It analyzes a finite instance of a TLA+
specification and checks whether desired properties are true in every execution of that instance. It is an explicit-state,
on-the-fly model checker written in Java. TLC keeps data on disk and makes efficient use of the disk by a sophisticated
algorithm for not limiting the size of the specification to be handled. TLC is also multi-threaded and can take advantage of
multiprocessors [4].
3. The dock fire-fighting system description
Our running example is a systemused to fight fires thatmay happen at ship docks. It operates the fire-fighting equipment
under the control of a user and displays information about the current operating state. The physical configuration of the dock
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Fig. 2. The physical configuration of the system.
Fig. 3. The architecture of the system.
is illustrated in Fig. 2. The dock has two berths for boats. There are two water cannons that can be used (exclusively) for fire
fighting.Water is supplied to the cannons by a pump that drawswater fromawater tank. Several valves connect the different
components. For example, cannon1 can be used for fire fighting only if both valve1 and valve2 are opened.
The control panel contains buttons and status indicators for the different components of the dock, as shown in Fig. 3.
There is a self-locking button for power, six non self-locking buttons for starting and stopping the pump, selecting the place
(berth1 or berth2) on fire, confirming and canceling the indicated settings. A hand-handle is used to control the direction of
the cannon in use. There are seven lights to indicate the status of the system. For example, the light pump is on when the
pump is opened and is off when the pump is closed. Cannons are selected implicitly by the choice of the berth; the lights
cannon1 and cannon2 reflect which cannon is in use.
When there is a fire-fighting request, the user can control the equipment using the panel. The preparatory steps of the
operations are as follows: (1) power up the system (by pressing down the power button); (2) open the pump (by pressing
the openpump button; (3) according to the place on fire, select berth1 or berth2; (4) confirm the selection; (5) control the
direction of the cannon by the hand-handle. To shut down the system, the user proceeds as follows: (6) close the pump first
(by pressing the closepump button); then (7) press the cancel button to finish the procedure. Finally, one can restart by going
back to step (2) or finish by uplifting the power button.
The PLC system responds according to the user operations, its computations and the feedback of the controlled plants.
Specifically, it opens or closes the pump, the corresponding valves, sends the directions to the cannon in use and shows the
system status by the lights on the control panel.
4. Specifying the PLC system with TLA+
In this section,we introduce howwe specify a PLC systemwith TLA+. Our presentation of the general specification pattern
is explained using the dock fire-fighting example.
4.1. Specifying system parameters
Just as with real systems, specifications should be written with regard to extensibility. For example, we can specify a
concrete dock fire-fighting system consisting of two fire cases and a particular physical routing. However, as a high-level
specification, it is better to be flexible and parameterize the system instead of restricting it to a fixed configuration. Of course,
what and howmuch to generalize is an important decision the system designer has tomake, which depends on the practical
situation.
For this case, users and engineers told us that themode of operation is fixed, but that it is desirable to adapt the controller
to different numbers of fire cases to fit further fire-fighting requests. Moreover, the correspondences between cannons and
fire-fighting cases should be parameterizable, although the relation is always one-to-one. Moreover, the physical route is
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also susceptible to change when new equipment is added. Hence, we take the fire cases, the cannons, the correspondence
between fire cases and cannons, the valves and the physical connections between valves and cannons as parameters. The
parameters are declared by the CONSTANTS statements in TLA+:
CONSTANTS FireCase,
Cannon,
Valve,
CannonInCase(_),
BelongTo(_)
where FireCase, Cannon, Valve denotes the set of all the fire cases, cannons, and valves, respectively. CannonInCase(_)
and BelongTo(_) are constant operators. CannonInCase(c) = i represents that the cannon c is used in the fire case i.
BelongTo(v) = c denotes that the valve v belongs to the cannon c. To get the concrete specification of the current system,
what we need is just to replace each parameter with its actual value. For our example, the correspondence is specified as
follows.
FireCase = {“berth1”, “berth2”}
Cannon = {“cannon1”, “cannon2”}
Valve = {“valve1”, “valve2”, “valve3”, “valve4”}
CannonInCase(“cannon1”) = “berth1”
CannonInCase(“cannon2”) = “berth2”
BelongTo(“valve1”) = “cannon1”
BelongTo(“valve2”) = “cannon1”
BelongTo(“valve3”) = “cannon2”
BelongTo(“valve4”) = “cannon2”.
4.2. Variables for representing the system state
The state variables var of a PLC specification can be grouped into four classes: user variables (UV), system variables
(SV), plant variables (PV) and auxiliary variables (AV). A group of variables is expressed as a tuple in TLA+, so we have
vars , UV ◦ SV ◦ PV ◦ AV. The four classes are self-explanatory by their names. For the fire-fighting case, UV are those
representing the buttons and the hand-handle. SV are those representing the lights, the valves, the pump command, the
cannon command and the system state. The system responses also depend on the real status of the plant. In our case, the
group PV consists of exactly one variable realPump representing the pump status. Variables in group AV are not related to
the semantics of the system, but make it easier to write the formal specification in TLA+.
A straightforward choice for representing the system statewould be to use BOOLEAN for each button and light and use the
variables u_handle, s_handle taking values in the set Direction , {“up”, “down”, “left”, “right”, “none”} for the user hand-handle
and the cannon commands. However, we would obtain at least 17 variables (7 for buttons, 7 for lights, one for user cannon,
one for pump command and one for cannon command) in this case.With the system scale increasing, this representationwill
result in many state variables and make the specification hard to manage. Moreover, only a few variables typically change
during a system step, leading to long UNCHANGED formulas (with UNCHANGED V denoting the tuple V doesn’t change in
the action). We therefore aim at obtaining a better state representation that leads to a concise and readable specification.
Here we use three arrays for the buttons, the button lights and the cannon lights. Arrays are represented by functions in
TLA+. For example, the function s_buttonLight denoting the array of button lights is specified with the domain ButtonLight
and the range Boolean as follows.
s_buttonLight ∈ [ButtonLight → BOOLEAN]
where ButtonLight , {“power”, “pump”, “confirmed”, “berth1”, “berth2”} is the set of all the lights related to the buttons. In this
way, for example, the system action that lights the power light can be written in TLA+ as
s_buttonLight ′ = [s_buttonLight EXCEPT ![“power”] = TRUE].
This formula should be compared to the equivalent action specification for the direct state representation, which reads
∧ s_powerLight ′ = TRUE
∧ UNCHANGED 〈s_pump, s_comfirmed, s_berth1, s_berth2〉.
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Fig. 4. The data transmission among the components.
4.3. Specifying the reaction pattern of the PLC
The fundamental purpose of our specification is to capture the interaction between the PLC controller and its
environment. Here the environment refers to both user operations and feedback from the plant. There are several possible
interaction modes. For example, one environment action can occur in the midst of a series of system actions, or on the
contrary, the system may react only after several environment actions. However, to specify a proper interaction with users
of our system, we expect that each environment action should be captured and processed by the system, even if the system
does not actually need to react given its current state. This is ensured by the inherent scanning cycle running pattern of PLC
controllers. It consists in receiving the input signals at the beginning of a cycle, then processing these inputs, and finally
generating the outputs at the end of the cycle, after which a new cycle is started.
Moreover, the input values can be viewed as being discarded at the end of each cycle, because PLCs will recheck
environment inputs at the beginning of the next cycle. In summary, the pattern on PLC reaction is illustrated in Fig. 4.
To implement this interaction in TLA+, we use an auxiliary variable named aux to enforce the PLC scanning sequence, as
shown in Fig. 4. The TLA+ template for this reaction mode is written is as follows.
Next , ∨ ∧ aux = 0
∧ EnvInput
∧ UNCHANGED SV
∧ aux′ = 1
∨ ∧ aux = 1
∧ SystemAction
∧ UNCHANGED UV
∧ aux′ = 2
∨ ∧ aux = 2
∧ ClearEnvInput
∧ UNCHANGED SV
∧ aux′ = 0.
The next action Next can be either a environment action EnvInput , a system action SystemAction or the input clearing
action ClearEnvInput . We will indicate the specification of these actions in the following sections. The auxiliary variable aux
ensures proper sequencing of the individual actions.
4.4. Specifying the environment action
The environment includes both user input via the control panel and the feedback of the controlled plant (fire-fighting
equipment). Both provide the inputs to the PLC. We introduce first the specification of user operations, then that of plant
feedback, and finally their combination.
Specifying user actions. This part is related with the state variable tuple UV , 〈u_button, u_handle〉. Users can operate the
buttons or the cannon handle on the control panel. In practice, users can operate the buttons and the cannon handle in an
arbitrary manner, not necessarily according to the description of proper operation given at the end of Section 3. The PLC
should cope with arbitrary user action; for example, it should not crash. Therefore, we define the action formula UserAction,
which describes all possible user actions.
UserAction , ∧ u_button′ ∈ [Button→ BOOLEAN]
∧ u_handle′ ∈ Direction.
This formula only asserts ‘‘type correctness’’; in particular, the user may press any number of buttons and/or operate the
cannon to move in any direction.
Specifying feedback of the plant. As described previously, we only consider reactions of the pump and therefore have
PV = 〈realPump〉 consisting of a single variable. Again, the pump need not always operate according to our expectations.
For example, it may fail unexpectedly. However, we assume that the sensor data represented by variable realPump reflects
the actual pump status. We obtain the TLA+ action formula
PlantAction , realPump′ ∈ BOOLEAN.
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Deriving the environment specification. User actions and feedback of the controlled plant make up the environment of the
PLC controller. We have mentioned the scan cycle mechanism of PLCs and presented the corresponding TLA+ description in
Section 4.3. However, the user operations and the plant feedback are independent and without any sequential constraints.
We onlywish to express that the variables in UV change only according to formulaUserAction and that variables in PV change
according to formula PlantAction (if at all). Using the square bracket notation of TLA+, this can be written as
EnvInput , [UserAction]UV ∧ [PlantAction]PV
where for any action formula A and state function v, the formula [A]v is defined as A ∨ v′ = v.
4.5. Specifying system actions
The PLC system should react to anymeaningful input according to its functional specification.Whenno reaction is defined
or necessary, it should simply maintain its current state. (In more elaborate cases, one could for example react to erroneous
input with an error message.) We therefore obtain the following pattern for the specification of the system action:
SystemAction , ∨ React
∨ NoReact
where React (specified below) describes the expected system reactions and NoReact , defined as
NoReact , ∧ ¬ENABLED React
∧ UNCHANGED SV,
covers the remaining cases. ENABLED A gives the enabling condition of the action A.
The action formula React is a disjunction of several action formulas, each describing one possible response of the system:
React , ∨ PowerUp
∨ OpenPump
∨ PumpLightOn
∨ ∃i ∈ FireCase : SelectCase(i)
∨ Confirm
∨ ResponseHandle
∨ ClosePump
∨ PumpLightOff
∨ Cancel
∨ PowerDown.
The meaning of the different actions are also obvious by their names. Here, we only present the detailed definition of the
OpenPump action as an example.
The current state of the system according to its expected operating cycle is represented by the variable s_sysState. In our
case study, this variable takes values in the set
StateSet , {“init”, “power”, “openpumpSent”, “pumpopened”, “selected”,
“cannonOnUse”, “closepumpSent”, “pumpclosed”}.
Opening the pump is possible when the power is switched on and the user presses the openpump button, but no other
button on the control panel. The action is specified by the formula
OpenPump ,
∧ s_sysState = “power” (1)
∧ u_button[“power”] (2)
∧ u_button[“openpump”] (3)
∧ ∀i ∈ UnlockedButton : i 6= “openpump”⇒ ¬u_button[i] (4)
∧ pumpCtl′ (5)
∧ s_sysState′ = “openpumpSent” (6)
∧ UNCHANGED 〈s_buttonLight, s_cannonLight, s_handle, valve〉. (7)
The conjuncts (1)–(4) represent the enabling condition of the actionOpenPump; lines (5)–(7) describe the effects of executing
the action. In more detail, the action denotes that when the system is at the state power (line (1)), the self-locked button of
‘‘power’’ is not lifted up (line (2)), the openpump button was pressed by the user (line (3)) and no other button is pressed
down at the same time (line (4)), the action OpenPump is enabled. When it is executed, it will send the pump opening
command (line (5)), set the system state to be openpumpSent (line (6)), and leave the other variables unchanged (line (7)).
The specification of the other actions is very similar. Overall, the representation of transition systems in the action logic
of TLA+ leads to system specifications that are easy to understand and clean.
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4.6. Composing the whole specification
As indicated in Section 2, the overall system specification is composed of the description of the initial states Init , the
action formula Next representing the next-state relation and the liveness constraints L.
The initial state is easy to define by considering the tuples of variables SV, UV, PV, and AV. For the system variables SV,
all the lights are off, the pump command has not been issued, and the system state is “init”. As to the user variables UV, the
buttons are not pressed down initially, and we assume that the directions of the user cannon and the cannon commands are
initially “none”. Similarly, the plant variable realPump can be assumed to be false initially. Finally, the auxiliary variable aux
takes initial value 0. Therefore, the initial condition is defined by the following TLA+ formulas:
InitUser , ∧ u_button = [i ∈ Button 7→ FALSE]
∧ u_handle = “none”
InitPlant , realPump = FALSE
InitSystem , ∧ s_buttonLight = [i ∈ ButtonLight 7→ FALSE]
∧ s_cannonLight = [i ∈ Cannon 7→ FALSE]
∧ s_handle = [i ∈ Cannon 7→ “none”]
∧ s_sysState = “init”
∧ valve = [i ∈ Valve 7→ FALSE]
∧ pumpCtl = FALSE
Init , ∧ InitUser
∧ InitPlant
∧ InitSystem
∧ aux = 0.
The action Next representing the next-state relation was already defined in Section 4.3. As for the liveness constraint, we
will only rule out infinite stuttering of the system and therefore define
L , WFvars(Next)
to ensure that the PLC system never stops. The overall system specification is given by the TLA+ formula
Control , Init ∧ [Next]vars ∧ L.
5. Verifying the specification
TLC is a model checker developed for TLA+ specifications. Properties are again expressed as a temporal formula in TLA+.
Which properties should be verified, and at what point a system is considered correct, depends on the system at hand,
and we cannot give a general answer. However, several generic kinds of properties arise naturally for reactive systems. We
present these properties first, and then show how TLC is able to check them.We limit attention to safety properties because
the liveness condition of our example is very basic.
5.1. Properties classification
Limited response properties. The system should only execute the specified actions when users operate on the control panel
according to the intended interaction sequence. In other words, a system action can only be enabled (and then executed)
given certain well-defined conditions. As an example, the pump should not close if the system is not at the state that the
pump can be closed. This is represented by the following temporal formula in TLA+:
ClosePumpNotResponse ,
(u_button[“closepump”] ∧ s_sysState 6= “cannonOnUse”⇒ ¬(ENABLED ClosePump)).
This formula asserts that the action ClosePump is disabled unless both the user pressed the button closepump and the system
state is “cannonOnUse”.
Another temporal formula asserts that a fire case selecting will not be responded if it’s not at the right state:
SelectCaseNotRespond ,
(∀i ∈ FireCase : u_button[i] ∧ s_sysState 6∈ {“pumpopend”, “selected”} ⇒ ¬(ENABLED SelectCase(i))).
Competition properties. This class of properties expresses competition relationships among several objects, such that nomore
than one object can be selected as a result. For example, limited by the physical resources, we request that at any time, only
one fire case can be selected and processed. This is described by the formula CaseSelectOnlyOne:
CaseSelectOnlyOne ,
(∀i, j ∈ FireCase : s_buttonLight[i] ∧ s_buttonLight[j] ⇒ i = j).
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The mutex exclusion property of cannon using can be described by the following temporal formula:
CannonUsedOnlyByOne ,
(∀i, j ∈ Cannon : s_cannonLight[i] ∧ s_cannonLight[j] ⇒ i = j).
Another property we’d like to ensure is the mutex exclusion among the valves for different cannons. That is to say, at any
time, only the valves belonging to the same cannon can be opened at the same time. This is described by the formula
ValveMutex.
ValveMutex ,
(∀i, j ∈ Valve : valve[i] ∧ valve[j] ⇒ BelongTo(i) = BelongTo(j)).
Sequencing properties. Often, certain actions of the system should only be executed in a fixed order. The informal description
in Section 3 presented the expected sequencing of the interactions with the system. For example, the fire case selections
can only be executed after the pump is opened. The following formula expresses this property:
SelectAfterOpenPump ,
[∀i ∈ FireCase : (SelectCase(i)⇒ s_buttonLight[“pump”])]vars.
In other words, the fire case i can be selected only if the pump light is on, and therefore the pump has been opened. Note
that in TLA+, the property can be specified not only on the state variables but also on the actions.
Another sequencing property requests that the pump opening can only occur after the power is on. It is denoted by the
following formula:
OpenPumpAfterPower ,
[OpenPump⇒ s_buttonLight[“power”]]vars.
Priority properties. Certain system actions take priority over others. In our example, the button power has highest priority,
which means that whatever the system is doing, once the user uplifts the self-locked power button, the power will be off
and the system stops immediately. This property is described by the following formula:
ClosePowerAlwaysResponse ,
(¬u_button[“power”] ∧ s_buttonLight[“power”]
⇒ ENABLED PowerDown ∧ ¬ENABLED (SystemAction ∧ ¬PowerDown)).
The formula asserts that if the user uplifts the power button while power is on then only the action PowerDown is enabled
and all other system actions are disabled. As a result, the power will be turned off and the systemwill be stopped according
to the action definition of PowerDown.
The FCFSPriority formula defines another priority property, which denotes the first-come-first-serve characteristic of
cannon using.
FCFSPriority ,
∀i, j ∈ Cannon : (s_cannonLight[i] ∧ i 6= j ∧ u_button[CannonInCase(j)] ⇒ (¬s_cannonLight[j])).
Error checking properties. Besides the properties which are related to the application domain, we can define some general
properties to check errors in specifications writing. The mainly used one in the case of our practice is to check whether
the actions defined in the TLA+ specification can happen at some point. The basic idea is that each action defined in the
specification has its reason to be defined. If a defined action can never be enabled, there were probably some errors when
writing it. These kinds of properties are described by the formulas with the pattern:
CheckAction , [¬Action]vars
where Action is a general name for the action to be checked. The formula CheckAction is an invariant declaring that Action
is never executed. For example, the formula CheckOpenPump , [¬OpenPump]vars denotes that the OpenPump action never
happens. As to this kind of property, we expect the TLC model checker returns the result FALSE, and provides a counter
example showing a path that makes Action occur. If TLC returns the result TRUE, there are probably some errors in the
specification of Action and a further examination is needed.
5.2. Model checking with TLC
We checked the Control specification by the TLA+ model checker TLC (10 April 2008 Release), on a computer with an
Intel r© CoreTM 2 duo, T8100 2.10 GHz CPU and 3 GB memory.
Checking the properties. Regarding the error checking properties which are expected to be FALSE, we checked 12 properties,
each of which corresponds to ameaningful action in the specification. These error checking properties are defined in Table 1.
For all the 12 properties, TLC succeeded in returning the result FALSE and reporting a path to reach the corresponding action
as expected.
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Table 1
The 12 error checking properties.
No. Property definitions
1 CheckPowerUp , [¬PowerUp]vars
2 CheckOpenPump , [¬OpenPump]vars
3 CheckPumpLightOn , [¬PumpLightOn]vars
4 CheckSelectCases , [∀i ∈ FireCase : ¬SelectCase(i)]vars
5 CheckConfirm , [¬Confirm]vars
6 CheckResponseHandle , [¬ResponseHandle]vars
7 CheckClosePump , [¬ClosePump]vars
8 CheckPumpLightOff , [¬PumpLightOff ]vars
9 CheckPowerDown , [¬PowerDown]vars
10 CheckNoReact , [¬NoReact]vars
11 CheckUser , [¬UserAction]vars
12 CheckPlant , [¬PlantAction]vars
Consider the other four kinds of properties, which are expected to return TRUE by TLC on the TLA+ model. We checked
the 9 properties defined in Section 5.1. All 9 properties were successfully verified by TLC. It generated 203,010 states, of
which 99,275 were distinct, and verified all the 9 properties in 23.8 s.
Guiding the practice. A main task of a PLC program is to correctly represent the complicated logics among different actions.
In this sense, designing PLC systems with the method introduced in this paper is quite helpful. The first reason is the clear
representation of the enabling condition and the execution of an action in TLA+, see the example OpenPump in Section 4.5.
The second reason is the procedure to get a correct design with the help of TLC.
Take the OpenPump action as an example. With the informal description of the dock fire-fighting system, it is possible
for an intuitive description of OpenPump to be:
OpenPump ,
∧ s_sysState = “power”
∧ u_button[“openpump”]
∧ pumpCtl′
∧ s_sysState′ = “openpumpSent”
∧ UNCHANGED〈s_buttonLight, s_cannonLight, s_handle, valve〉.
That is to say, OpenPump is enabled when the system is at the “power” state, and the user presses the “openpump” button.
When we try the property CheckOpenPump in TLC, TLC can successfully return the result FALSE and provide a path to make
OpenPump occur. However, when inspecting the path, it shows that when the user presses both the “openpump” button and
the “closepump” button, the action OpenPump also happens. This phenomenon pushes us to question on what we expect if
more than one button is pressed down simultaneously? As one solution, we choose to accept only the single press of the
button “openpump” and add a condition ∀i ∈ UnlockedButton : i 6= “openpump” ⇒ ¬u_button[i] for the OpenPump action.
Besides, TLC also shows that the property ClosePowerAlwaysResponse doesn’t hold. It contradicts with our design to make
PowerDown the highest priority compared with other actions. As a result, we add another condition u_button[“power”] and
get the final description of the OpenPump action. These subtle problems will be hard to check without the support of a clear
and formal specification and then formal verification.
Further experiments. We also compare the Control specification with its two variations to justify our choices in designing the
specification framework. The compared results are shown in Table 2. Towards the first column in Table 2, Control denotes
the specification generated by the method presented in this paper. CtlTestUser is a variation which gives some constraints
on user actions: users can operate the buttons or the cannon handle, but not both. This variation is obtained by taking the
following formula for user actions:
UserAction , ∨ ∧ u_button′ ∈ [Button→ BOOLEAN]
∧ UNCHANGED u_handle
∨ ∧ u_handle′ ∈ Direction
∧ UNCHANGED u_button.
CtlTestEnv is the same as Control except that it discards the environment cleaning phrase when specifying the PLC running
pattern. The space and time costs for checking the 9 properties on the three specifications are shown from the second
column to the last column in the table. The 9 properties hold for all the three cases, while the costs are quite different. The
case CtlTestEnv needs remarkably greater time and space costs, which certifies the effectiveness of introducing ClearEnvInput
in our framework to simulate of PLC scan cycle. On the other hand, The case CtlTestUser needs less time and space costs than
our design Control, but pays the price of a weaker conclusion. Since CtlTestUser puts constraints on user actions, we can’t
verify the system responses beside the constraints. For example, what will happen when the user is pressing down some
button and operating the handle at the same time? On the other hand, Control doesn’t put any constraint on user actions,
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Table 2
Time and space costs comparisons.
Case Nodes Distinct nodes Run time (s)
Control 203,010 99,275 23.8
CtlTestUser 42,260 20,659 7.2
CtlTestEnv 57,923,243 99,221 1226.9
and thus avoids the over-specification of the environment, but with the price of more time and space cost. It’s up to the
designer to decide whether or how many constraints to put on the environment.
5.3. Processing larger problems
The specification framework presented in this paper is generic and can be applied to large-scale systems. The
parameterized TLA+ specification for the fire fighting case is still adaptable when devices or physical configurations are
changed, as explained in Section 4.1. However, to model check the TLA+ specification for large-scale systems, getting a
more abstract version is often necessary. There are several ways to achieve this.
First, the communication mode between PLC and its environment can use a synchronization pattern, instead of the
asynchronous one adopted in this paper, which considers the PLC scan cycle mechanism. The abstracted model would have
less state space for model checking. However, it would also keep farther to the later implementation.
Second, the environment model can be simplified. User actions or plant feedback are not random, but follow fixed
sequences usually. For large-scale systems, it’s often a good choice to consider the expected environment changes only,
to get a smaller state space for model checking. However, as we explained in Section 5.2, it is a tradeoff.
Third, an abstracted model can be obtained by simplifying the information of variables or abstracting some of them
away. For example, we have abstracted the direction of the cannon, which can be represented by a real number, to be an
enumerable variable with five values: {“up”, “down”, “left”, “right”, “none”}. We can further abstract it as a Boolean variable
denoting only moving or not. Further on, When the information of cannons is not much concerned, they can be even
abstracted away, by omitting the declarations and deleting all their appearances from the defined actions.
6. Related work
We take the specification language TLA+ to formally describe PLC systems. Undoubtedly, there are several other choices
besides TLA+. Among them, the languages based on state-transition systemsemantics are usually viewed suitable to describe
the behaviors of PLC systems. With model checking techniques and tools like NuSMV [7], Spin [8] being widely used in
engineering practice, their input languages are often taken as a specification language. In this section, we briefly introduce
some of them and comparisons with TLA+.
The input language of NuSMV is often used to model embedded systems. It is a language dedicated to model checking,
so it permits only finite states when describing system behaviors, while TLA+ can describe infinite states by parameterizing
the number of buttons, devices and so on. The input language of NuSMV is more primitive, and suitable for low-level
specifications. It provides array data structures, but the given operations are limited. Furthermore, TLA+ is designed for
formal reasoning, so it is possible to prove the parameterized TLA+ specifications directly with theorem prover support. The
input languages of other model checkers, like Promela for SPIN, have similar characteristics with the one for NuSMV.
There are some other powerful specification languages, for example the OBJ language Maude [9]. Maude is a high-level
declarative language based on both equational logic and rewriting logic. It is expressive, supporting the characteristics
of modularization and parameterization. Compared with TLA+, it is more convenient for Maude to define complicated
data structures. However, the semantics of the logics behind Maude is not trivial for engineers. On the other hand, TLA+
is based on “ordinary logics”, which are easier to learn and understand. Maude also provides object-oriented modules,
making it convenient for many applications. However, as far as we know, object-oriented programming languages have
not been widely used for PLC programming yet. The popular ones are assembly-like languages like ladder graph, Instruction
language [2], etc. There is still a big gap between object-oriented specifications and the procedure-oriented implementations
for PLC applications. Finally, similar to TLA+, Maude also has an on-the-fly explicit state model checker, which can verify
LTL formulas.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a format for the specification of PLC systems using the specification language TLA+, and
successfully verified a number of correctness properties using the TLC model checker. The specification format clearly
distinguishes between user actions, system actions, and plant feedback. The different categories of actions are specified
separately by TLA+ action formulas, which are then composed to form the overall specification. This separation makes
us confident that we avoided over-specification, in particular of the environment. Working in a high-level language such
as TLA+ allows a designer to focus on the essential features of a system specification, avoiding low-level encodings, and
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leading to configurable and concise specifications. The resulting specifications can nevertheless be analyzed by the TLC
model checker in a reasonable amount of time.We identified different kinds of properties that arise naturally in PLC systems.
In future work, we will consider the real-time specification of PLC systems by TLA+. Lamport [3,10] discusses formats for
specifying real-time system specifications in TLA+ and techniques for real-time model checking, but their applicability to
PLC specifications remains to be validated.
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